From properties to manners:
a historical line of thought about manner adverbs

Christopher Piñón

Université de Lille 3 / STL UMR 8163

Manner adverbs, although familiar, are puzzling, especially semantically. I trace a historical line of thought about how to treat them formally, beginning with Reichenbach in 1947 and continuing with Davidson, Bartsch, Dik, and McConnell-Ginet. While this is not the only line of thought about manner adverbs, it is arguably the most influential from the vantage point of 2008. Manner adverbs, like adverbs more generally, but perhaps more so than other categories, bring together issues of language and ontology. I conclude with a few remarks about Fodor's skeptical attitude towards manners.

1. Introduction

Although manner adverbs are a familiar category (or part of speech) from traditional grammar, they are a puzzling category from a theoretical perspective. Syntactically, manner adverbs seem to be close to the verb (see Ernst 2002 for a recent view on their syntax):

(1) a. Sarah spoke softly.
    b. Rebecca solved the problem quickly.

A sign of this closeness is that some verbs seem to subcategorize for manner adverbs, as observed in Jackendoff (1972: 64) and McConnell-Ginet (1982: 164–165):

(2) a. Sarah worded the letter carefully.
    b. *Sarah worded the letter.

(3) a.   Rebecca treated Sarah well.
     b.   *Rebecca treated Sarah.

On the semantic side, it is less clear "what manner adverbs do" beyond the general statement that they modify the action or process denoted by the verb.

In this paper, I will trace a historical line of thought about how to treat manner adverbs formally, beginning with Reichenbach in 1947 and continuing with Davidson, Bartsch, Dik, and McConnell-Ginet. While this is not the only line of thought about manner adverbs, it is arguably the most influential from the vantage point of 2008.[1] Manner adverbs, like adverbs more generally, but perhaps more so than other categories, bring together issues of language and ontology. I will conclude with a few remarks about Fodor's skeptical attitude towards manners.

2.   Reichenbach (1966)

Reichenbach (1966: sect. 53), in a work that was originally published in 1947, proposes what is probably the first formal semantic account of adverbs (in particular, manner adverbs) as second-order predicates of first-order properties. To see what his account looks like, consider his analysis of *Annette danced beautifully*, adapted from his (8) on p. 305:[2]

(4)   Annette danced beautifully ⇒

$$\exists f(f(\texttt{annette}) \wedge \texttt{dance}(f) \wedge \texttt{beautiful}(f))$$

In prose, this formula states there is a property f such that Annette has f, f belongs to the property of dancing, and f belongs to the property of being beautiful. If f belongs to a given property, then f is a specific subproperty of that property. In (4), since f belongs to the property of dancing, this means that f is a specific subproperty of the property of dancing (e.g., the property of moving gracefully according to the rules established for a certain kind of dancing). Moreover, since

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[1] The second most influential line of thought about manner adverbs comes from the Montagovian tradition, best represented by Thomason and Stalnaker (1973). In this tradition, manner adverbs are analyzed as second-order modifiers of verbal predicates. I do not discuss this line of thought here, but see McConnell-Ginet (1982) and Eckardt (1998: chap. 1) for a critical assessment of Thomason and Stalnaker (1973).
[2] Tense is ignored in this paper, because it is not crucially relevant to the issues addressed.

f also belongs to the property of being beautiful, *f* is a specific subproperty of the property of being beautiful as well (e.g., the property of moving gracefully just mentioned).

Reichenbach's analysis is remarkable in that it encodes the semantic contribution of the manner adverb as an independent property that is conjoined with the meaning contributed by the rest of the clause. This neatly accounts for the fact that the sentence in (4) entails *Annette danced* because the truth of the formula in (4) entails the truth of the corresponding formula without the conjunct contributed by *beautifully*:

(5) $\exists f(f(\texttt{annette}) \wedge \texttt{dance}(f) \wedge \texttt{beautiful}(f)) \rightarrow$

$\exists f(f(\texttt{annette}) \wedge \texttt{dance}(f))$

It would take another 20 years before Davidson (1967) would get a similar result using existential quantification over events.[3] Observe, though, that it would not be feasible to simply recast *f* in (4) as a Davidsonian event, because such an event could not be predicated of Annette, hence the conjunct *f*(annette) would not be sensible as it stands. Even so, Reichenbach's analysis in (4) is very much in the formal spirit of a so-called neo-Davidsonian approach (Parsons 1990).[4]

Despite the ingenuity of Reichenbach's account, the idea that manner adverbs are to be represented as second-order properties poses a conceptual difficulty in that it is not clear what it means for the properties beautiful, slow, etc. to be predicated of a property *f*. If Annette danced beautifully, then the way she moved in dancing was beautiful, and yet this is not at all directly captured by the

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[3] Although Davidson reviews an account by Reichenbach that makes use of a so-called fact-function, this account is first and foremost intended as a way of handling nominalizations and not as a way of treating manner adverbs. (See Reichenbach's sect. 48. For Reichenbach, a fact-function forms predicates of facts or events from propositions—note that he uses *fact* and *event* as synonyms.) Indeed, Reichenbach has reservations about using the fact-function in an account of manner adverbs, as I point out below. Davidson does not mention Reichenbach's account of adverbs as second-order predicates, a curious omission in my view.

[4] Parsons (1990: 60–61) claims that there is a "formal isomorphism" between Reichenbach's theory and the neo-Davidsonian one, but he does not provide the details of this isomorphism. Taken strictly, I think that he is mistaken about there being such a formal isomorphism between the two theories, even if there is a striking formal similarity between them. As mentioned in the text, it is not possible to simply recast Reichenbach's property *f* as a Davidsonian event. Moreover, if there were a formal isomorphism between the two theories, Reichenbach should probably get more credit for his theory and Davidson less for his, and yet Parsons does not write as though this were the case. (Martin Schäfer has suggested to me that I may be taking Parsons too strictly here.)

formula in (4). Viewed extensionally, *f* is a set of individuals, and so in (4) the property of being beautiful is predicated of this set. However, it seems wrong to say that a set of individuals is beautiful. Naturally, the individuals in the set may be beautiful, but this would be another matter altogether; and, besides, the sentence in (4) does not assert that Annette was beautiful, as Reichenbach in fact takes pains to point out (p. 305). Furthermore, intensionalizing *f* (as a function from indices to sets of individuals) would also not help because such functions are also not beautiful in the intended sense. In sum, treating manner adverbs as second-order properties as Reichenbach leaves a significant gap between the formal interpretation and the intuitive interpretation that needs to be filled in order to be satisfactory.[5]

Another remark about Reichenbach's account is that it does not sharply distinguish between verb and manner adverb meanings in that both are analyzed as second-order properties of (the same) first-order properties. For example, although Reichenbach does not provide a compositional semantics of the sentence in (4), it is clear that both *dance* and *beautifully* are lexically represented as properties of *f*, even if *dance* is taken to have an ordinary individual argument (namely, an agent argument) as well.

(6) a.   dance $\Rightarrow \lambda f.\texttt{dance}(f)$ *or*

  dance $\Rightarrow \lambda x \lambda f.f(x) \wedge \texttt{dance}(f)$

 b.   beautifully $\Rightarrow \lambda f.\texttt{beautiful}(f)$

In other words, in Reichenbach's approach, verb and manner adverb meanings are symmetrical in that they are both mainly predicated of the same sort of entities, namely, first-order properties of ordinary individuals. Consequently, there is no systematic way to tell, for a given second-order property represented in a formula, whether it is contributed by a verb or a manner adverb. The difference between these two categories is thus largely syntactic as opposed to semantic.

Interestingly, Reichenbach briefly considers but rejects another way of analyzing manner adverbs. In the alternative conception, manner adverbs are interpreted as predicates of facts (or events, for he does not distinguish between these two

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[5] Parsons (1990: 60–61) makes a similar criticism of Reichenbach's treatment of *slowly*, but note that this criticism is originally due to Bartsch (1970: 29).

categories). In this conception, the sentence in (4) receives the following analysis, adapted from his (14) on p. 307:

(7)   Annette danced beautifully ⇒

$\exists f (f(\texttt{annette}) \wedge \texttt{dance}(f) \wedge$
$\texttt{beautiful}\{\iota v[f(\texttt{annette})]^*(v)\})$

The analysis in (7) makes use of Reichenbach's so-called fact-function, denoted by the asterisk, which applies to a proposition (here, $f(\texttt{annette})$) and yields a predicate of facts (or events). The iota operator ι, which binds the fact variable v, is then applied to the result to create a definite description of facts (or events), namely, the fact that the property f (as in (4), a specific subproperty of the property of dancing) holds of Annette. It is this fact (or event) that is asserted to be beautiful. Since facts (or events) are first-order entities in Reichenbach's system, *beautifully* is now represented as a first-order property, in contrast to its treatment in (4).

In (7), it appears that Reichenbach is even closer than he is in (4) to a Davidsonian approach to manner adverbs (see section 3). However, he objects to the alternative analysis for the following reason. The difficulty, as he sees it, is that the formula in (7) does not succeed in expressing the connection between the property of being beautiful and the manner of dancing, whereas the formula in (4) does—or at least let us grant that it does—because in the latter the property of being beautiful qualifies the property f directly. In (7), the property of being beautiful qualifies *the fact* that the property f held of Annette, but this fact may be qualified in many ways that have nothing to do with the manner of dancing per se. For example, if the fact that the property f held of Annette led to her being noticed by a talent scout, then the property of leading to her being noticed by a talent scout could also qualify the fact that the property f held of Annette, and yet this would say nothing about the manner of dancing per se. In short, Reichenbach's point is that the properties contributed by manner adverbs qualify something more specific than facts (or events), namely, the specific properties f that the properties contributed by verbs are also predicated of, as in (4).

It is perhaps easy not to sufficiently appreciate Reichenbach's point against the analysis in (7), especially because the analysis in (4) is not so unproblematic

either.[6] Even so, this point of criticism is recalled by Dik (1975) many years later, who then attempts to meet it (see section 4).

3. Davidson (1967)

Although Davidson's (1967) aim is not an account of manner adverbs,[7] his approach offers a ready way of handling them. In its neo-Davidsonian version (Parsons 1990), the idea is that both verbs and manner adverbs are analyzed as predicates of events and that the ordinary individual arguments of the verb are linked to the events denoted by means of thematic relations (e.g., agent, patient, etc.) between events and ordinary individuals.[8] A standard neo-Davidsonian analysis of the sentence in (4) would be as follows:

(8) Annette danced beautifully ⇒

$$\exists e \,(\texttt{agent}(e) = \texttt{annette} \wedge \texttt{dance}(e) \wedge \texttt{beautiful}(e))$$

Just as in Reichenbach's analysis, the inference from *Annette danced beautifully* to *Annette danced* is automatic, but now the question of how to understand the contribution of *beautifully* is less problematic because it seems more intelligible to say that an event of dancing may be beautiful than it is to say that a property (or set) of ordinary individuals may be.

Another feature that the neo-Davidsonian approach shares with Reichenbach's is that the treatment of verbs and manner adverbs is symmetric: both of these are analyzed as predicates of events. Thus, here again the central difference between verbs and manner adverbs is taken to be syntactic rather than semantic even if (as an alternative) verbs are considered to have ordinary individual arguments as

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[6] Reichenbach may be taken to task for confounding facts and events, but his argument against the analysis in (7) stands even if he were to properly distinguish between these two categories.

[7] Indeed, Davidson even explicitly sets aside manner adverbs such as *slowly* because of their dependence on (what would now be called) a comparison class. At the same time, at least on my reading of his text (see e.g. Davis and Gillon 2004: 736), he does not rule out the possibility of a conjunctive analysis of manner adverbs—he simply points out that they cannot be treated solely as one-place predicates of events. See Parsons (1990: sects. 4.2.1, 4.2.5) for why manner adverbs do not pose a special problem for Davidson's approach.

[8] The defining feature of a neo-Davidsonian approach is that the ordinary individual arguments of verbs are factored out as thematic relations. This still leaves open the question whether the lexical representations of verbs explicitly include these relations or not (if not, they have to be entailed with the help of meaning postulates).

well. On analogy with (6), the lexical representations of *dance* and *beautifully* in a neo-Davidsonian approach would be as follows:

(9) a. dance $\Rightarrow \lambda e.\texttt{dance}(e)$ *or*

         dance $\Rightarrow \lambda x \lambda e.\texttt{agent}(e) = x \wedge \texttt{dance}(e)$

     b. beautifully $\Rightarrow \lambda e.\texttt{beautiful}(e)$

Bartsch (1976: 165–170) offers what is probably the earliest extensive discussion of manner adverbs in a kind of neo-Davidsonian framework, even if she does not make the connection to Davidson's original approach explicit (again, a curious omission). Her analysis of the sentence in (4) would be as follows, based on her (b) on p. 166:

(10) Annette danced beautifully $\Rightarrow$

      $\langle \exists r (\texttt{in}(r, \texttt{annette}) \wedge \texttt{dance-proc}(r) \wedge r = \texttt{r}) \rangle \wedge$
      $\texttt{beautiful}(\texttt{r})$

In (10), r is variable for processes (effectively, Davidsonian events) and $\texttt{r}$ is a constant for processes (effectively, discourse referents for processes).[9] The relation $\texttt{in}$ may be viewed as a general thematic relation between processes and ordinary individuals ($\texttt{in}(r, \texttt{annette})$ 'Annette is a participant in r'), and the material between the angled brackets represents the presuppositional content of the sentence (according to Bartsch). In prose, this formula says that there is a process r of dancing that has Annette as a participant, this process is named $\texttt{r}$, and $\texttt{r}$ is beautiful. Since Bartsch does not provide a compositional semantics, it is not obvious how representations like the one in (10) are derived, but it is clear that verbs and manner adverbs contribute predicates of processes, which suffices for classifying her analysis as belonging to the neo-Davidsonian family of analyses.

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[9] Since Bartsch (pp. 73–74) draws an ontological distinction between processes and events, I no doubt misrepresent her by saying that her processes are "effectively" Davidsonian events. Even worse, I believe that her events are also "effectively" Davidsonian events. Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to discern the distinction between processes and events that she has in mind, and a statement such as "It is not the process itself that is the event, but rather the occurring of the process becomes an event" (p. 74) only adds to the puzzle. This said, I may have missed something.

It is safe to say that the (neo-)Davidsonian approach to manner adverbs has been the dominant one in recent years. For instance, Eckardt (1998), Geuder (2000), and Schäfer (2005) all basically treat manner adverbs as predicates of events, even if the exact empirical coverage and theoretical details of their approaches otherwise differ.

4.   Dik (1975)

Dik (1975: 116–119), in an insightful discussion of manner adverbs, asks what it is that manner adverbs modify. He criticizes a close variant of the analysis in (10) by Bartsch because it does not solve the problem raised by Reichenbach with respect to the analysis in (7). Recall from section 2 that the problem with the formula in (7) is that it does not express that Annette's way of dancing was beautiful. However, Dik's point is that the formula in (10) does not either, because the property of being beautiful merely qualifies the process (or event) of dancing and not the way of dancing. Naturally, the same criticism applies to the neo-Davidsonian analysis in (8) because here too the property of being beautiful is predicated of the event of dancing and not of the way of dancing. In order to address this problem, Dik suggests making 'manner' a basic element in semantic representations. More specifically, he proposes that all situations involving control (by an agent) or change have an implicit manner in which they are carried out, where manners are now construed as first-order entities. Dik's analysis of the sentence in (4) is essentially as follows, adapted from his (146) on p. 118:

(11) Annette danced beautifully ⇒

$\exists s(\texttt{dance}(s, \texttt{annette}) \wedge \texttt{beautiful}(\texttt{manner}(s))$

In (11), the constant `manner` designates a 'manner function' from situations to manners, i.e., `manner`(s) denotes *the* manner of s (here, s is a situation of dancing), and it is this manner that is beautiful. Accordingly, the content of the analysis in (11) may be more conspicuously represented as follows, with explicit quantification over manners:

(12) $\exists s \exists m(\texttt{dance}(s, \texttt{annette}) \wedge \texttt{manner}(s) = m \wedge$
      $\texttt{beautiful}(m))$

Dik recognizes that manner cannot do duty for all manner adverbs. For example, he says the manner adverb *quickly* qualifies the speed of a situation and so there is also a function from situations to speeds. Thus, in a sentence such as *Annette danced beautifully and quickly* the two manner adverbs each modify a different coordinate (manner and speed, respectively) of the situation described.[10]

Dik also acknowledges that his proposal is preliminary and stands in need of further elaboration. Nevertheless, it seems to be on the right track. Furthermore, it constitutes a natural refinement of Davidson's approach: manner adverbs are no longer represented as predicates of events but rather as predicates of manners; and yet manners are dependent on events. Finally, in this conception, verbs and manner adverbs are no longer semantically symmetrical but rather asymmetrical, because their meanings are predicated of different sorts of entities: events and manners, respectively. The syntactic difference between verbs and manner adverbs is now matched by a semantic one. Given a representation like that in (11) or (12), it is straightforward to determine which predicate is contributed by a verb and which by a manner adverb.

As mentioned above, Dik thinks of 'manner' as a certain function manner from situations to manners, and for speeds there would be a speed function from situations to speeds. Yet it is hard to feel entirely satisfied with this picture, for should speeds not also be manners? And what about sound intensities (e.g., *softly*)?

By way of clarification, let us think of 'manner' in two senses. The first sense is that of a *manner function*: in this sense, a manner is a kind of function, e.g., the function speed from events to speeds that Dik alludes to would count as a manner. This sense of 'manner' may be represented as $\lambda f.\text{manner-funct}(f)$, where f is a variable for functions of the appropriate sort. Thus, the statement that speed is a manner may be formalized as manner-funct(speed). In this conception, there are potentially many manner functions and not just one, as Dik supposes. Accordingly, there is also no need for his function manner, because this is now replaced by a more specific manner function where needed. A 'manner' in the first sense is thus a second-order property of (first-order) functions of the appropriate kind.

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[10] Bartsch (1976: 150, 170–172) also speaks of specific "coordinates" such as speed that may be modified by manner adverbs. Even so, her discussion of coordinates appears more as an afterthought and coordinates do not play a role in her main analyses of sentences with manner adverbs. In this respect, Dik is much clearer about what is at stake.

A more difficult question is to say what should count as a manner function (ultimately, this is an empirical question). As a first approximation, it seems correct to say that a manner function is a function of the logical type $\langle e, e \rangle$ from events to certain "coordinates" dependent on those events, e.g., the function speed yields the "speed coordinate" of a motion event. However, certain kinds of entities should not count as "coordinates" in the intended sense. For instance, if thematic relations (agent, patient, etc.) are construed as functions from events to ordinary individuals (as e.g. agent in (8)), they would be of the same logical type (though at the same time not of the same *sortal* type) as manner functions and yet they should not count as manner functions. Thus, ordinary individuals should not be considered "event coordinates" in the intended sense, and probably events and times should not be either.[11] Even so, what is still wanting is a positive characterization of the inventory of manner functions.[12]

The other sense of 'manner' is that of an *individual manner*: in this sense, a manner is a concrete first-order entity, albeit one that depends on or "lives on" a certain event. This sense may be represented as $\lambda a.\texttt{individ-manner}(a)$, where a is a variable for first-order entities. This predicate may be defined in terms of the values of manner functions as follows:

(13) individ-manner $\equiv$

$\lambda a.\exists f(\texttt{manner-funct}(f) \wedge$

$\exists e \exists b(f(e) = b \wedge b = a))$

Accordingly, the particular speed of a particular motion event e (i.e., speed(e)) is a manner in the sense of (13).

An attempt at recasting the analysis in (12) in an neo-Davidsonian approach with manner functions and individual manners is shown as follows, where the manner function form yields the spatial form (which is an individual manner) of the event of dancing:

(14) $\exists e \exists m(\texttt{agent}(e) = \texttt{annette} \wedge \texttt{dance}(e) \wedge \texttt{form}(e) = m \wedge$

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[11] If correct, then the so-called temporal trace function that yields the "run time" of an event would also not count as a manner function.
[12] It may also be that certain manner functions are more complex, depending on ordinary individuals (e.g., agents) as well—perhaps *carefully* is an example.

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beautiful(m))
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5.   McConnell-Ginet (1982)

It may be doubted that McConnell-Ginet (1982) belongs to the line of thought about manner adverbs traced here. By all appearances, her paper falls squarely in the Montagovian tradition and her central preoccupation is with how manner adverbs help 'build' logical form. Her ontology, like Thomason and Stalnaker's, lacks events, but ontological considerations are not in the limelight anyway—her main effort is devoted to developing an analysis in which manner adverbs (for her, so-called Ad-Verbs) combine with verbs by becoming arguments of them. She implements this by introducing a rule for augmenting the argument structure of verbs with an argument place for manner adverbs so that a verb may take a manner adverb as an argument. Her concern is largely syntactic (in the sense of 'logical form'); indeed, as far as I can tell, she never clearly says what logical type manner adverbs belong to.[13]

Of present interest is not McConnell-Ginet's specific rule for augmenting a verb's argument structure but rather her remarks about the example *Joan runs quickly* on p. 170. She gives the following meaning postulate (her (59)) for *quickly*, where α^+ stands for a verbal predicate that has been augmented to subcategorize for a manner adverb:

(15) If α^+(`quickly`) is defined,

then $\exists b$ such that $\alpha^+(b)$ is defined and `rate`(b), and

α^+(`quickly`) is synonymous with $[\alpha^+(b) \wedge$ `quick`$(b)]$.

She then notes that this postulate is crucial for making a sentence such as *Joan runs quickly if and only if Joan runs at a quick rate* necessarily true.

But what does the variable b range over in (15)? Rates? If so, then are these not individual manners, akin to Dik's speeds? Notice that `rate` is not a manner function in (15) but rather a predicate of individual manners; even so, b seems to be an individual manner. If my construal of this part of McConnell-Ginet's account is correct, then she (like Dik, though independently of him) also assumes

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[13] On p. 164, in connection with *behave*, which lexically subcategorizes for a manner adverb, she writes that it is "a two-place relation, the second argument of which is whatever kind of entity adverbs designate." It is unclear what the logical type of 'entity' is here.

a domain of individual manners, even if she does so implicitly, without any fanfare. I find this to be a remarkable aspect of her analysis (again, assuming my construal is correct).[14]

6.   Fodor (1972): doubts about manners

Fodor presents a number of potential problems for Davidson's account of the logical form of action sentences in terms of quantification over events. Of present interest are his remarks concerning the sentence in (16a) (his (7)) and the possible analysis in (16b) (his (25)). He considers the latter to be a "non-starter" (p. 58) as an analysis of the former, which—in view of clearly—is a correct assessment. (I take the liberty of slightly adapting his representations.)

(16) a.   John spoke clearly.

     b. $\exists e(\text{speak}(e, \text{john}) \wedge \text{clearly}(e))$

Fodor then considers three alternative analyses, all of which involve quantification over manners (in addition to events), and all three of which he finds problematic.[15] The most promising of the three (also according to him) is given in (17) (his (40)):

(17) $\exists e \exists m(\text{speak}(e, \text{john}) \wedge R(e, m) \wedge \text{clear}(m))$

Fodor considers it "ontologically disreputable" (p. 63) to quantify over manners, but his main problem with the analysis in (17) is that it expresses a primitive relation R between events and manners which he finds "implausible and unilluminating" (p. 64). He says that if we ask which relation this primitive relation R is, "we are forced, in the meta-meta language, to resort to constituent modification all over again: i.e. to say that 'it is a relation which obtains iff a certain agent ((performs) in a certain way) a certain action'."

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[14] At the same time, the postulate in (15) may not be completely coherent as it stands. The worry is that if α^+ should be able to apply to quickly or b (the latter denotes an individual manner, if I am correct), then quickly should be of the same logical type as b. Yet it seems implausible that quickly should denote an individual manner as opposed to a manner function or a predicate of individual manners (like quick in (15)).

[15] It is curious that Fodor does not consider simply changing clearly in (16b) to clear, which would seem to be the most obvious alternative.

In present terms, there is indeed a general empirical difficulty in determining, for any proper occurrence of a manner adverb, what kind of individual manner it is predicated of (i.e., what manner function is at issue), but this difficulty seems to me ultimately unavoidable. At the same time, Fodor may be too pessimistic and may give up too quickly. In (16a), if we take the sense of *clearly* in which it is the articulation of the speaking that is clear, then this sentence could receive the following analysis:[16]

(18) John spoke clearly $\Rightarrow$

$\exists e \exists m(\texttt{agent}(e) = \texttt{john} \wedge \texttt{speak}(e) \wedge$

$\texttt{articulation}(e) = m \wedge \texttt{clear}(m))$

In (18), $\texttt{articulation}$ is a manner function that yields the articulatory form of an event of speaking.

I suspect that Fodor would not be satisfied with something like the analysis in (18) either (for his worries about the Davidsonian enterprise go beyond the question of manner adverbs anyway), but my point is that the feasibility of an analysis of (16a) is not so hopeless once we have manner functions and individual manners (in addition to events) at our disposal. Be that as it may, Fodor's discussion is historically significant because it is probably the earliest explicit mention of the possibility of manners as first-order entities in an ontology for natural language, even if he is strongly inclined to reject them in the end.[17]

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[16] *Clearly* in (16a) may also refer to the content of the speaking.
[17] I am grateful to Martin Schäfer for very helpful comments on the first draft and especially for reminding me of the relevance of Fodor (1972). I also appreciate the editorial efforts of the editors.

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